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Abstract
The proliferation of malware is a serious threat to com-
puter and information systems throughout the world. Anti-
malware companies are continually challenged to identify
and counter new malware as it is released into the wild.
In attempts to speed up this identification and response,
many researchers have examined ways to efficiently auto-
mate classification of malware as it appears in the environ-
ment. In this paper, we present a fast, simple and scalable
method of classifying Trojans based only on the lengths of
their functions. Our results indicate that function length
may play a significant role in classifying malware, and,
combined with other features, may result in a fast, inexpen-
sive and scalable method of malware classification.
1 Introduction
Malware refers to a broad class of malicious software
that threatens computer and information systems and net-
works. Such software may modify, destroy or steal data,
may obtain unauthorized access to confidential information
and exploit vulnerabilities in applications. Authors of mal-
ware often obfuscate the executable components so as to
make the malware more difficult to identify. In [2], the au-
thors identify four ways in which this is commonly done.
These are: the insertion of dead code that does not change
the original code in any way, interchanging the uses of reg-
isters, replacing one sequence of instructions with an equiv-
alent one, and permuting instruction sequences in the code
without changing the code behaviour. In this paper, we do
not assume that the malware under analysis has been de-
obfuscated. However, we do assume that the malware we
consider has been unpacked, that is, it has not been com-
pressed or encrypted in any way.
In combatting malware, the major approach has been to
establish links between the software in order to classify it
into categories and hence speed up the development of a re-
sponse based on an understanding of the intent of a class
of malware. Many organizations have accumulated zoos of
malware obtained over many years and these have generally
been examined in a relatively slow, often manual process to
determine the intent of the code. The malware analyzed in
the current paper is from CA’s VET zoo (www.ca.com);
thus it has been pre-classified using generally acceptable
mechanical means. Such a classification relies on the abil-
ity to determine the significant feature or features which
establish the true identification of the malware. This sig-
nificant feature is referred to as ‘the signature’. Many re-
search papers have been directed at determining this signa-
ture [8], [10]. The implication is that there is some unique
factor which defines a piece of code. While this may be the
case for a specific sample, given the many obfuscation tech-
niques, it is unlikely to be true for a general family; there
may be several features of a piece of code which together
indicate its purpose, but which separately do not definitively
reveal this information.
“According to Symantec and Microsoft, typically only a
few hundred families appear in any half-year period. This
places the number of variants in an average family in the
thousands per half-year period. The Microsoft data shows
that the top seven families account for more than 50 per
cent of all variants found. The top 25 families account for
over 75 per cent.” [14] Thus it is highly likely that any new
malware is a variation of some previous program.
For many years, malware analysis has been done with
file management systems in which the malware is stored as
a file and files are organized in a directory tree. A new piece
of malware was then matched against these files. In order
to perform the work presented in this paper efficiently, we
moved to a database environmentwhich provided us with an
integrated management interface, a standard format for bi-
naries and better and faster interoperability with other tools
and databases. We use Ida2sql (www.dkbza.org), a Python
module which exports disassembly information from our
disassembly tool IDA into the SQL schema [1]. However,
as we explain in Section 3, we added a number of features
in order to make our analysis more effective.
IDA (www.hex-rays.com/idapro/ ), and other disassem-
bly tools, segment code being analyzed into what are gen-
erally called ‘functions’. These functions are not necessar-
ily self-contained software routines which perform a certain
task as defined by a programmer. An IDA function is sim-
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ply an independent piece of code identified as such by IDA.
We discuss this further in Section 3.
In this paper, our aim is to use the functions, as deter-
mined by IDA, as the basis of a classification system for
malware. We use two aspects of these functions: one is the
length of the function as measured by the number of bytes
of code in it; the other is the frequency with which func-
tion lengths occur within any particular sample of malware.
These values are easy to obtain as output from IDA for any
unpacked input. We gather this data for seven families of
Trojans, encompassing 721 files in all. Our results indicate
that both function features are significant in identifying the
family to which a piece of malware belongs; the frequency
values are slightly more significant than the function lengths
with respect to accuracy while the reverse is true with re-
spect to the rate of true positives.
In Section 2, we summarize the relevant literature in this
area. In Section 3, we detail our analytical approach and in
Section 4 describe the experimental set-up. Sections 5 and
6 present the two tests, the first based on function frequency
and the second on function length. Section 7 analyzes and
compares the results of the two tests. We conclude in Sec-
tion 8.
2 Related Work
In recent years, many researchers have turned their at-
tention to the analysis and classification of malware using
many different approaches. In all the literature cited here,
malware samples are assumed to be unpacked unless other-
wise mentioned.
Gheorghescu [4] uses basic blocks of code in the mal-
ware, which are defined as ‘a continuous sequence of in-
structions that contains no jumps or jump target’ and on av-
erage contain 12-14 bytes of data. These blocks are used
to form a control flow graph. The (string edit) distance be-
tween two basic blocks is defined to be the number of bytes
in which the blocks differ. Thus malware is compared us-
ing the edit distance. Some improvements for producing
the data are also mentioned. Results are presented on 4000
samples of Win32 malware. An important contribution of
this paper is that the author demonstrates that it is possible
to implement an automated real-time system to perform this
analysis on a desktop machine.
Kapoor and Spurlock [5] argue that binary code compar-
ison of the malware itself is not satisfactory because it is
error prone, can easily be affected by the injection of junk
code and because code comparison algorithms are expen-
sive with poor time complexity. They argue that comparing
malware on the basis of functionality is more effective be-
cause it is really the behaviour of the code that determines
what it is. These authors assign weightings to code func-
tions depending on the complexity of the function, hypoth-
esizing that the more complex the function, the more likely
it is to define the code behaviour. A function tree is then
constructed based on the control flow graph of the system,
and used to eliminate ‘uninteresting’ code. They then con-
vert the tree description of a malware sample to a vector
and compare vectors to determine similarity of malware.
The major drawback of this method is the intensive pre-
processing which must be done in determining the weight
to assign to each function.
Several authors have used sequences of system calls, API
calls and function calls of malware in order to model its
behaviour. Peisert et al. [9] use sequences of function calls
to represent program behaviour. Sathyanarayan et al. [10]
use static analysis to extract API calls from knownmalware
in order to construct a signature for an entire class. The
API calls of an unclassified sample of malware can then
be compared with the ‘signature’ API calls for a family to
determine if the sample belongs in the family or not. In our
opinion, obfuscation of API calls could affect the accuracy
of their results. Sathyanarayan et al. use IDA to assist in
API extraction. They provide outcomes of their tests on
eight families with 126 samples in total. API Calls are also
used by [16] to compare polymorphic malware.
Christodorescu et al. [3] take a different approach, argu-
ing that it is the behaviour of malware that should be used to
classify it. Viewing the malware as a black box, they focus
on its interaction with the operating system, therefore using
system calls as the building blocks of their technique. They
compare these with system calls of non-malicious code in
order to trim the resulting graph of dependencies between
calls. Results are presented based on an analysis of 16
pieces of known malware. These methods are intensive as
behavioral information for each piece of malware has to be
collected and a graph is then constructed for it.
Most classification approaches assume that the malware
is unpacked. Unpackingmalware is a difficult and slow pro-
cess which needs techniques quite different from those used
for classification. Many research groups focus solely on the
unpacking problem. Thus we, along with most classifica-
tion researchers, assume that we are working with malware
which is not packed.
In the following section, we present our approach to the
classification problem based on a data set of seven fami-
lies of Trojans. On the positive side, our methods are sim-
pler and faster than those discussed above and scale well
to large size samples, unlike those methods based on tree
or graph comparisons. On the negative side, using function
size and frequency appears to give a correct classification in
only about 80% of cases and so these features must be used
with others for a better determination.
3 Sample Preparation
Our general approach to the classification problem is to
extract a broad set of features from each malware sample
that can be passed to an automated classification system.
The process is to first unpack the malware samples, then
disassemble them using IDA, export the disassembly anal-
ysis to a database, and then extract a feature vector. Fig-
ure 1 shows the architecture of our classification system. In
the experiment described in this paper the feature extraction
70 2008 3rd International Conference on Malicious and Unwanted Software (MALWARE)
Authorized licensed use limited to: DEAKIN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY. Downloaded on November 3, 2009 at 21:49 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
only extends to function length information.
Figure 1. Malware Classification System
based on Ida2DB
It is necessary to unpack the malware samples before
analysing them with our system. We used the free software
program named VMUnpacker v1.3, to unpack most of our
samples in this experiment. In a few cases we unpacked the
samples using manual processes.
We use IDA Pro V5.1 as our disassembly tool. Our sys-
tem uses Ida2sql, a Python module, to export the disas-
sembly information from IDA into an SQL database which
we call Ida2DB. The schema for Ida2DB is adapted from a
schema in Sabre-Security’s BinNavi product. We modified
the schema to support Microsoft SQL Server DBMS, and
we changed the database structure to use a fixed number of
tables in which to store binaries. We also added some other
disassembly information, such as strings extracted from ex-
ecutables. The next step in the process is to generate com-
ponents of a feature vector by analysing the database from
different perspectives. Our aim is to find features that are
simple and inexpensive to extract but that can be used to dis-
tinguish between different families. For the purpose of this
experiment, we programmed database functions and stored
procedures to fetch function length information from the
database.
Our architecture allows us to effectively extract large
amounts of disassembly information and obtain a wide
range of features of a malware sample in a swift and simple
way.
4 Experimental Set-up
In some initial experiments we extracted function length
information from our Ida2sql database. For each sample we
constructed a list containing the length (in bytes) for all the
functions. We then sorted the list from the shortest length
function to the longest, and graphed it. We call this the
function length pattern. Figure 2 gives three samples from
the Robzips family.
With samples from within the same malware family, we
noticed that although the number of functions and their
lengths varied, the shape of the function length pattern
looked similar. This motivated us to investigate whether
Figure 2. Example Function Length Patterns
function length contains statistically significant information
for classifying malware.
The unpacking process may not produce the original bi-
nary. In addition, when IDA disassembles unpacked mal-
ware, it identifies functions according to its own auto-
analysis procedure [11]. The functions finally extracted
may be different from those returned by the malware pro-
grammer. Although it is difficult to be precise in regard to
exactly what is meant by a function in the context of this
experiment, we are nevertheless using a reliable and repeat-
able process.
In this experiment, function length is defined to be the
number of bytes in the function as defined by IDA. The
function length pattern vectors are the raw input given to
our experiments. An example function length vector, taken
from the Beovens family, is (24, 38, 46, 52, 118, 122, 124,
140, 204, 650, 694, 1380). (All vectors and sets referred to
in this paper are ordered.) Each component in this vector
represents the length of a function in the example. There
are 12 functions in the sample, and the function lengths
are 24, 38, 46, . . . , 1380 respectively; the maximum func-
tion length is 1380.
In our experiment we used 721 files from 7 families of
Trojans. Table 1 lists the families we looked at and the num-
ber of samples from each family.
Family Number of Samples
Clagger 47
Robknot 101
Robzips 82
Alureon 43
Bambo 41
Beovens 144
Boxed 263
Table 1. Number of Samples used from each
Family in our Experiment
The raw function length vectors are of different sizes
so are not directly comparable. We tried two different ap-
proaches to creating vectors of standardized size. The first
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was to count the frequency of functions of different lengths
(described in Section 5), the other was to standardize the
function length vectors to be of the same size and scale so
that the patterns could be compared (described in Section
6).
Figure 3. Overview of our experimental Pro-
cess
In order to determine whether function length informa-
tion can be used in classification, we choose, in each test
and for each family, a target vector, which we call a ‘cen-
troid’ and determine how close each sample is to this cen-
troid. For a good choice of the centroid, we expect samples
in the family to be close in a carefully defined statistical
way, and we expect samples not in the family to be far.
We used k-fold cross validation in each test [6]. For each
family we randomly partitioned the vectors into 5 subsets
of approximately equal size. We used one subset as the test
set, and combined the other 4 subsets as the training set.
We used the training set to calibrate the test and validated
the effectiveness of the centroids against the test set. This
was repeated 5 times, so that each vector was used as a test
sample.
Our classification used an adaptation of the technique
described by [10]. For each training set we calculated a
centroid vector. We used statistical methods to determine
whether a test vector was sufficiently close to the centroid
vector to be classified as belonging to that family.
5 Function Length Frequency Test
We first introduce some standard notation which is re-
ferred to throughout this section and the next. Let P =
{P1, P2, . . . , PN} represent a general population of N func-
tion length vectors. P∗ represents the set of all the standard-
ized vectors. We use F for a set of vectors from a specific
family having n samples. For any particular function vector
Pk with mk elements, we write Pk = (pk1, pk2, ..., pkmk)
and refer to mk as the size of the function length vector.
In both the tests of Sections 5 and 6, we use the k-fold
cross validation method discussed in Section 4, applying
it five times. In both cases, T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tr} ⊂ F
represents a training set chosen from the family F. Then
Q = F−T = {Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn−r} is used as a test set.
Each entry Ti in the training set is represented by the vector
Ti = (ti1, ti2, . . . , tim¯), and each entry Qi in the test set is
represented by a vector Qi = (qi1, qi2, . . . , qim¯).
5.1 Data Processing
The function length frequency test is based on counting
the number of functions in different length ranges. We di-
vide the function length scale into intervals, which we call
bins, and for each sample count the frequency of functions
occurring in each bin. Due to the order of magnitude dif-
ferences between function lengths, we increase the range
covered by our bins exponentially. For example, we might
count the number of functions of lengths between 1 and e
bytes, the number between e and e2 bytes, etc. In our exper-
iment, we choose m¯ = 50 as the number of bins. This now
allows us to associate a new vector of size 50 with each
function length vector in the population as described below.
In introducing a factor to include the height variations, we
map an exponential function over the entire spectrum of the
dataset, from heights 1 to M , the maximum function length
across the complete dataset. Assuming that this exponen-
tial function is given by y = aekx where y(0) = 1 and
y(m¯) = M , it follows that a = 1, k = lnM/m¯, and so
y = e
lnM
m¯
x
.
Thus, for any Pk from the population, the entry in the
standardized form P ∗k of Pk of size 50 is:
P ∗kj = |{pki|e
ln(M)
m¯
(j−1) ≤ pki ≤ e
ln(M)
m¯
j ,
i = 1 . . .mk}| (1)
for j = 1 . . . m¯.
5.2 Statistical Test
We assume that the vectors of the entire population have
been standardized as described in Section 5.1. For each
family F we choose 80% as a training set from which
we compute a single ‘centroid’ vector to use in comparing
against the entire dataset as a means of classification. We
obtain this centroid vector A = (a1, a2, . . . , am¯) by com-
puting each term as follows:
aj =
1
r
r∑
i=1
tij , j = 1 . . . m¯. (2)
For each family, this process is repeated five times, each
time using a different 80% of the family and in such a way
that each vector appears in exactly one test set.
For each training set, the complement within the family
is used as the test set. The Chi-square test is applied as a
test for Goodness of Fit of the centroid vector and vectors
in the training set [12]. For each Ti = (ti1, ti2, . . . , tim¯) in
the training set, a Chi-square vector χ2 = (χ21, χ22, . . . , χ2m¯)
is computed as
χ2j =
(tij − aj)
2
aj
, j = 1 . . . m¯. (3)
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Finally, χ2 is compared against a threshold value  from
a standard Chi-square distribution table [12]. A significance
level of 0.05 is selected, which means that 95% of the time
we expect χ2 to be less than or equal to . For each Ti, let
Ui = {tij |χ
2
j ≤  , j = 1 . . . m¯}. (4)
For each Ti, the value λi defined by:
λi =
|Ui|
m¯
(5)
represents the proportion of components of Ti which fall
within the threshold . Thus
λA =
1
r
r∑
i=1
λi (6)
represents the proportion of elements of the training set
which fall within the threshold.
We now apply this test to the set of standardized vectors
from the entire dataset, excluding those used in the training
set. Let T∗ be the set of adjusted vectors from T as in
Equation (1). Let X now be any vector from the set P∗ −
T∗. We compare X with A by applying Equations (3) and
(4) to produce λX as in Equation (5).
LetP (F,A) represent the set of vectors which were clas-
sified by our test as belonging to the family. It is constructed
as follows :
X ∈ P (F,A) iff λX ≥ λA. (7)
We repeat this process for all five training sets of each fam-
ily.
Table 2 in the next subsection summarizes the classifica-
tion accuracy of our tests.
5.3 Test Result
FAMILY P N Accuracy TPRATE FPRATE
CLAGGER 47 3370 0.9699 0.8085 0.0279
ROBKNOT 101 3100 0.9884 0.6337 0
ROBZIPS 82 3195 0.9774 0.7683 0.0172
ALUREON 43 3390 0.6685 0.7209 0.3322
BAMBO 41 3400 0.6493 0.6098 0.3503
BEOVENS 144 2885 0.9243 0.5417 0.0565
BOXED 263 2290 0.9651 0.6653 0.0004
average 0.8776 0.6783 0.1121
Table 2. Function Length Frequency Results
For each family F in Table 2, TP represents the true
positives, that is the number of samples belonging to the
family which our test correctly classified. Formally, TP =
|Q∩P (F,A)| represents the number of samples in Qwhich
were placed in P (F,A) for any of the centroid vectors A.
TN represents the true negatives, that is the number of sam-
ples not in F which were not placed in P (F,A) for all five
centroid vectors A. Similarly, FP represents the false posi-
tives, the number of samples not in F which were placed
in P (F,A) by any centroid A, while FN represents the
false negatives, the number of samples in Q which were
not placed in P (F,A) by some centroid A. The total num-
ber of positives, P = TP + FN , is the set of elements of
Q repeated five times, one for each centroid, while the total
number of negatives, N = TN +FP , is the set of elements
not in F, again, repeated five times. Finally, the True Pos-
itive and False Positive rates are generated over the whole
population and all five tests (per family) as in Equation (8).⎧⎨
⎩
TPrate = TP/P
FPrate = FP/N
Accuracy = (TP + TN )/(P + N)
(8)
The Accuracy in Equation (8) measures how closely the
test determines true containment, or not, in the family. We
thus expect it to be close to 1. While this is the case in
Table 2, the average True Positive rate is a little disappoint-
ing. This motivated us to continue to the test described in
Section 6.
6 Function Length Pattern Test
The graphs of function lengths of malware samples de-
scribed in Section 4 appear to have some similarities within
families and differences across families. In this section, we
again use function length as a distinguisher, but in a dif-
ferent way from the approach in Section 5. In this test we
directly use the pattern made by the function length. We
use two steps in order to prepare the data. First, we stan-
dardize the vector size across the entire dataset by resizing
the function length vector along the x-axis by a rational fac-
tor. Each term in the new vector is a weighted average of
corresponding terms in the old vector. In the second step,
we retain the shape of the pattern of function lengths by
standardizing along the y-axis family by family. We do this
by multiplying each component of the old vector by a for-
mula derived by averaging the first component (the shortest
function length) and last component (the longest function
length). The standardization of vector size must be made
across the whole database as we need to compare all vec-
tors pairwise; the standardization of height is done family
by family as this appears to be a significant identifier.
6.1 Data Processing
Step 1: standardize vectors in the complete dataset
We first obtain the average size over all vectors in the
dataset m¯ = m1+m2+...+mN
N
. Then for each arbitrary PK
we standardize it by using the continuous function f defined
over the domain [0,mk) given by:
f(x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
pk1, 0 ≤ x < 1
pk2, 1 ≤ x < 2
.
.
.
pkmk , mk − 1 ≤ x < mk.
(9)
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We create the new vector P¯k of length m¯, by dividing the
domain of f into m¯ equal sections and calculating the mean
value of f(x) over each section of the domain. That is,
p¯kj =
1
C
∫ jC
(j−1)C
f(x)dx (10)
where C = mk
m¯
and j ∈ {1, 2, ..., m¯}.
Each point in the function length vector Pk
is given equal representation in the resized vector
P¯k = (p¯k1, p¯k2, ..., p¯kmk).
Step 2: standardize pattern height family by family
We choose a training set T from a family F (refer to
Section 5 for the notation). Let P¯k ∈ T ⊂ F. We average
over the first component and then over the last component
in each vector Pk ∈ T. Let v1 = 1n (p¯11 + p¯21 + . . .+ p¯n1),
and vm¯ = 1n (p¯1m¯ + p¯2m¯ + . . . + p¯nm¯). We obtain the jth
entry in the standardized vector P ∗k = (p∗k1, p∗k2, . . . , p∗km¯)
from P¯k by:
p∗kj =
(vm¯−v1)
(p¯km¯−p¯k1)
(p¯kj − p¯k1) + v1, j = 1 . . . m¯. (11)
At this point, all vectors in the population have been stan-
dardized for size and each family has been standardized for
pattern.
6.2 Statistical Test
For each family we choose an 80% subset as a training
set from which we compute a single centroid vector to use
in comparing against the entire dataset as a means of classi-
fication. We assume that all vectors have been standardized
as in Section 6.1. We again run this test five times, each time
using a different 80% portion of the family. For each test
and each family, we calculate v1 and vm¯ using the method
above. Using Equation (2) of Section 5.2, we compute the
centroid vector A = (a1, a2, . . . , am¯).
In [15] the author states that for large samples, the
assumption of the parent population being normally dis-
tributed is not needed for the Student t-test. Assuming the
whole dataset has a t-distribution, we therefore use the Stu-
dent t-test to compare the centroid vector with a sample vec-
tor. The standard deviation vector S = (s1, s1, . . . , sm¯) is
calculated by:
sj =
√∑k
i=1(tij − aj)
2
k
. (12)
For each Ti in the training set and for each component
tij we calculate the t-value to test whether the component’s
value is consistent with belonging to the family. For each
Ti, we get τi = (τi1, τi2, . . . , τim¯) using the following for-
mula:
τij =
∣∣∣∣ tij − ajsj
∣∣∣∣ . (13)
We choose a confidence level α = 0.05 which means we
expect that 95% of the values are within  standard deviation
of the centroid vector. Thus if τij ≤ , this component is
consistent with belonging to the family. In our experiment,
the number of samples in each family is different, so we
adjust  according to the size of each family. For each Ti,
let
Ui = {tij |τij ≤  , j = 1 . . . m¯}. (14)
Then we get the degree of membership λi from Equation
(5) and the threshold λ for the family from Equation (6).
We thus acquire both the centroid vector A and a threshold
λ for each family. Based on these, we calculate the true
positive and false positive rates as in Equation (8). Table 3
presents the statistical analysis results of the function length
pattern test.
FAMILY P N Accuracy TPRATE FPRATE
CLAGGER 47 3370 0.6128 0.9361 0.3917
ROBKNOT 101 3100 0.8688 0.8416 0.1303
ROBZIPS 82 3195 0.8276 0.8537 0.1731
ALUREON 43 3390 0.9849 0.6977 0.0115
BAMBO 41 3400 0.8718 0.7805 0.1271
BEOVENS 144 2885 0.7821 0.8542 0.2215
BOXED 263 2290 0.6722 0.9126 0.3555
average 0.8029 0.8395 0.2015
Table 3. Function Length Pattern Results
The True Positive rate achieved in this test is much
higher than that in the previous test while the level of Accu-
racy was retained.
7 Discussion
The results of both tests show the true positive rate to be
much higher than the false positive rate. If function length
contained no information we would expect the true positive
rate and the false positive rate to be relatively equal. We can
therefore conclude that function length contains statistically
significant information in distinguishing between families
of malware, and is therefore a useful component for consid-
eration in a classification of malware. Our results also indi-
cate, however, that function length alone is not sufficient.
The function length pattern method correctly identified
a higher proportion of the true positives compared with the
frequency method. However, the frequency method had a
lower false positive rate, giving it a higher overall accuracy.
We believe that this is because in our function pattern length
method we vary how close a test vector needs to be to the
centroid vector depending on the Student t-distribution of
the training set. This will broaden the accepted range for a
family with a degree of variability. However the broader ac-
ceptable range is likely to also accept more false positives.
Adapting the threshold of how closely a test sample fits
the signature depending on the variability of the training set
adds flexibility and robustness to the classification process.
It allows us to accept a broad range of values for features
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of the family for which there is high variability, while being
strict for features of the family that are consistent.
Our approach is efficient to execute and scalable. Our
training and classification processes both execute in O(n)
time, where n is the number of malware samples. Our
feature extraction is highly efficient because we leverage
DBMS technology. Our techniques have wider application
and could be applied to any kind of feature vector, not just
function length information, to produce more robust signa-
tures.
We note that our results are comparable to those of [10]
for the family of Trojans.
Our results show that function length information can be
used in classifying Trojans, which suggests that, for this
type of malware, some elements of program structure re-
main recognisable throughout the variants within a family.
We believe, however, that function length information is un-
likely to be an effective input for classifying some other
types of malware, such as viruses, where the malicious code
is difficult to extract. Without separating the virus code
from the host file (a difficult task), the function length in-
formation obtained from a virus would be primarily related
to the host file program structure rather than the virus itself.
To classify viruses, one could use similar statistical tech-
niques as described in this paper combined with different
types of information extracted from the executable.
Our technique relies on unpacking. Recent advances [13,
7] in unpacking research provide the tools for generically
extracting the executables from samples packed by the most
advanced packers.
8 Conclusion
With an increasing number of malware programs appear-
ing every day, a scalable automated classification system for
identifying variants of existing families will be an essential
tool for anti-malware researchers. We have demonstrated
that function length may play a significant role in such a
classification by identifying malware of the Trojan variety.
However, our results also show that it is unrealistic to expect
function length information on its own to produce perfect
accuracy in distinguishing between families.
While applying more advanced pattern recognition tech-
niques may yield a higher accuracy, they are more resource
intensive than the methods we have demonstrated here, and
so less scalable.The longterm goal then is to find a scaleable
method based on features in addition to function length
which improve on our current classification method and
extend to other malware families. Such features may in-
clude string information, imported functions, frequency of
opcodes and the original entry point, all of which are avail-
able in our Ida2DB database. We expect that an extension
to a broad vector of these features will greatly improve the
classification accuracy, whilst maintaining the scalability.
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